




DDOS ATTACKS IN THE REAL WORLD

HOW TO MITIGATE THEM

# Who Am I?


- Tobias Heister
- Solutions Architect
  - Technical Pre-Sales
  - Vendor MGMT for Focus Vendors
  - Solutions Engineering and Partner Evaluation
  - XT3LAB
- 3y Deutsche Telekom – Carrier and DC
- 8y Host Europe - Hosting Provider, Network centric Roles (Engineering, Managed Services)
- 3y Xantaro – Professional Services for 1y then SOLAR





- Our core competency is **SERVICE INTEGRATION** – the development and integration of solutions across technological and corporate boundaries.
- We plan, implement and maintain the networks and services of our customers, thereby supporting their business success.
- For our customers, we are their **TRUSTED ADVISOR** and the „**NO-WORRY-COMPANY**“, that inspires and creates an ultimate level of trust through absolute customer and service focus, ambitious execution, technical expertise and quality.
- 150 People (135 DE, 15 UK), >70% technical

# OUR TECHNOLOGY SOLUTIONS – Covering All Network Layers




- DoS to DDoS
  - Ping of Death
- Volumetric Attacks
  - UDP based (no state on attacker side)
  - Reflection (Initiator does not attack directly)
  - Spoofed Sources
- Application Layer Attacks (Low and Slow)
  - Consume/Saturate Resources or Time Slots (Tar pitting, Slowloris)
  - State Exhaustion (Connection Tables, Memory, available Processes)
  - Scanning/Reconnaissance (find Vulnerability, weak passwords)
- Combinations
  - Volumetric Attack used as Smoke Screen
  - Targeted Application Layer Attack or Exploit/Hack





# You can only fight what you see

- First Step is Detection (which has to be as automatic as possible)
- Multiple ways
  - Log Files, Flow Exporting, Customers Calling, Inline Solutions
- Volumetric Attacks have visible impact and Collateral Damage for the network
  - 250G coming into a 10G pipe will create Service Loss for everyone
  - Can take out entire network/infrastructure
- Application Attacks take out a specific service but may not be visible
  - Slowloris attack on single Webserver will not be noticeable on NOC Dashboard
  - Will likely hit single customers/service



# Typical Detection Scenarios




- Most Systems available work on Thresholds
  - Defined per Segment/Customer/Network/Prefix per Protocol/Features/Behaviour Limit for \$timeframe
  - What is normal? Do the limits change over time?
- Some Systems provide Profiling
  - Learn for a period of time defined as normal, if specific threshold over normal -> alarm
  - (automatically) re run Profiling
  - How to make Sure that Profiling does not take place during attack? What if threshold level is triggered by valid event? (AD Campaign, \$event, ...)
- Fingerprints (Somebody knows it is bad so i can drop it without checking)
- Artificial Intelligence
- Escalation on Volume/Impact, if Threshold is X for Ymin and Impact is 100 times X reduce monitored timeframe
- We can only analyze what we see (Flow Exporting and Sampling vs. Inline)




# Remove Threats


- Once Threats are detected we can do something
- Network centric
  - ACL/Firewall Filter
  - Remote Triggered Blackholing (if possible source based) -> IP Only
  - BGP Flow Spec -> IP/Proto/Port and a bit more
- Attack centric
  - Redirect/Off-Ramp Attack to Scrubbing Appliance
  - On-Ramp Cleaned Traffic
- External Help
  - Remote Triggered Blackholing send to Upstream/Carrier
  - BGP Flow Spec send to Upstream/Carrier
  - „Cloud based“ Mitigation (works only for  $\geq /24$  or  $/48$ )




- Once detected and send to Mitigation Appliance we can analyze further ( $\geq$  Layer4)
- Common Countermeasures
  - Basic Compliance, valid IP, TCP, UDP, ICMP, Checksums
  - Syn Authentication (OOS Ack, Redirect, Cookies)
  - Rate Limiting for BW, Connections (What is good? What is bad)
  - Regional Blocking (For a German Web shop DACH may be fine, the Rest of the World can stay away)
  - Protocol Compliance
    - Valid Verbs/Actions or Syntax
    - Reasonable Amount of Objects/queries
    - Strict/Loose RFC Handling
    - Timeouts
  - Proxy/CGNAT Handling (Client Identification)
  - SSL Handling, Handshake Compliance, Decrypt SSL?



- Common Countermeasures (continued)
    - Payload Analysis
      - ▶ Which DNS queries are valid (do we need to allow ANY queries?)
      - ▶ Regular Expression against Payloads (e.g. Fingerprints, Custom Expressions)
      - ▶ Bit/CodePoint of Death
    - Create enough Statefullness to identify threats
      - ▶ Reflection Attacks (lots of answers without any questions)
      - ▶ Slowloris
    - But keep Statefullness to a minimum to protect yourself
- ⇒ Most Countermeasures rely on Input for defining „normal“ Operation
- ⇒ Only activate meaningful Countermeasures




- Once identified as bad by Mitigation Appliance
  - If know bad source, block early
    - ▶ Blacklist on Mitigation Appliance hits before any expensive analysis is performed
    - ▶ Offload Blacklist to network ((s)RTBH, Flow Spec)
    - ▶ Share Knowledge (Fingerprints, Blacklists)
  - If only part of source is bad (e.g. 1/1000 Customers behind CGNAT)
    - ▶ Block Traffic but do NOT Blacklist
    - ▶ Identify Attacker and Share Knowledge
      - DDOS Sharing Initiative




# Normal Operation

- Core Router communicate with Peakflow SP
  - Core => SP send netflow/IPFIX
  - Core <=> SP speak BGP/SNMP
- Traffic passes Core Router
- Traffic passes APS
- Traffic reaches Customer Router




# Volume Attack

- Peakflow SP detects Attack and raises Alarm
- Peakflow SP starts mitigation
  - Attack Traffic will be redirected to Peakflow TMS
  - PeakFlow TMS mitigates Attack
  - Peakflow TMS sends clean Traffic Back to Core
- Traffic passes APS
- Traffic reaches Customer Router




# Small Attack

- Small Attack
  - low bandwidth (below 1G in this example)
  - Application based, thus not detectable via netflow
- Attack traffic passes Core router
- No alarm raised on Peakflow SP
  - Not detectable via netflow
- APS detects attack
- Attack traffic reaches APS
- APS mitigates attack traffic
- APS send clean traffic to customer



# Larger Attack

- larger Attack
  - high bandwidth (above 1G in this example)
  - Application based, thus not detectable via netflow
- APS detects attack
  - local mitigation impossible due to bandwidth
- APS contacts Peakflow SP
  - uses cloud signalling
  - informs about attack type and size
- Peakflow SP starts mitigation
  - Attack Traffic will be redirected to Peakflow TMS
  - PeakFlow TMS mitigates Attack
  - Peakflow TMS sends clean Traffic to APS
- Clean Traffic passes APS





# Market Players – Xantaro Partner Portfolio

Inline Detection/Mitigation



Out of Band Detection



Off-Ramp Mitigation

Cloud Based Mitigation

# Designing a Solution

- Integration of existing End to End Vendor Solution
  - Integrate into existing Network
  - Understand Traffic Flows
  - Deploy Solution
  - Support and Vendor Communication
  
- Create Xantaro Product
  - All of the above
  - Product Tailor made for Customer
  - Bring together vendors to form a solution

